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TOO DANGEROUS TO EXIST: HOLDING COMPROMISED INTERNET
PLATFORMS STRICTLY LIABLE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES
Jordan Glassman*
In July 2020, the Twitter accounts of several prominent public
figures were compromised. The maximally high profile of these
targets raises the possibility of severe physical, or, more likely,
economic damages from the fallout of these security failures.
Because compromises of this type are foreseeable and inevitable in
the context of software security, and because there is no feasible
avenue for seeking damages for the resulting purely economic
losses, a new scheme for relief is needed. This Article proposes
that the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities be applied to internet platforms whose inevitable
compromises are situated to proximately cause catastrophic
economic damages. This application of strict liability is measured
against policy goals, and common-law obstacles to its adoption
are discussed.
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The true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings
on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief
if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima
facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of
its escape.
– Justice Blackburn, Court of Exchequer Chamber, 1868 in
Rylands v. Fletcher1

I. INTRODUCTION
On July 15, 2020, the Twitter accounts of numerous prominent
moguls, celebrities, and politicians were compromised, including
those of Joe Biden, Barack Obama, Bill Gates, Elon Musk, and

1

Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 339–40.
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Kim Kardashian, among some 130 others.2 The attackers offered to
generously double the money of credulous users as part of an
apparent bitcoin scam.3
While the compromise was quickly contained and the actual
monetary damages were minimal, the maximally high profile of
the targeted individuals immediately prompted speculation on the
damage a more ambitious malicious actor could have wrought.4
For example, because world leaders now routinely use Twitter to
announce or criticize policy decisions, it is easy to envision a
scenario wherein a forged tweet from the account of the U.S.
President or the Kremlin could spark major financial market
movement or even preemptive military action.5

2

Joe Tidy & David Molloy, Twitter Hack: 130 Accounts Targeted in Attack, BBC
(July 17, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53445090 [https://perma.cc/
85WC-CCA3]; see also An Update on Our Security Incident,
TWITTER (July 30, 2020, 5:45 PM) https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/compan
y/2020/an-update-on-our-security-incident.html [https://perma.cc/8BW9-6GN4].
3
Rishi Iyengar, Twitter Blames ‘coordinated’ Attack on its Systems for Hack of
Joe Biden, Barack Obama, Bill Gates and Others, CNN (July 16, 2020, 6:38 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/15/tech/twitter-hack-elon-musk-bill-gates/index.html
[https://perma.cc/G5R7-MMEC]; see also Who’s Behind Wednesday’s Epic
Twitter Hack?, KREBS ON SEC. (July 16, 2020, 5:41 PM),
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2020/07/whos-behind-wednesdays-epic-twitter-hack/
[https://perma.cc/X5FX-J3D5].
4
Casey Newton, The Massive Twitter Hack Could be a Global Security
Crisis, VERGE (July 15, 2020, 8:27 PM), https://www.theverge.com/interface/20
20/7/15/21325708/twitter-hack-global-security-crisis-nuclear-war-bitcoin-scam
[https://perma.cc/HF34-873U].
5
See, e.g., HEATHER WILLIAMS & ALEXI DREW, ESCALATION BY TWEET:
MANAGING THE NEW NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY 6 (2020), https://www.kcl.ac.uk/cs
ss/assets/10957•twitterconflictreport-15july.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2QP-PU6L];
see also Casey Newton, A Catastrophe at Twitter, INTERFACE (July 15, 2020), https:
//www.getrevue.co/profile/caseynewton/issues/a-catastrophe-at-twitter-263960
[https://perma.cc/8HYA-C4JU] (“After today it is no longer unthinkable, if it ever
truly was, that someone take over the account of a world leader and attempt to
start a nuclear war”). Compare Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump [https://perma.cc/L46W-PJS6] (last visited
Sept. 13, 2020), with President of Russia (@KremlinRussia), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/KremlinRussia [https://perma.cc/Y8FE-6XEL] (last visited
Sept. 13, 2020) (illustrating a particularly sharp and well-publicized contrast).
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Given that many of the internet platforms6 routinely used by
powerful public figures lack any statutorily imposed security
protocols, no consumer-facing internet service can be considered
secure, much less perfectly so.7 Under these circumstances, to what
extent do Twitter and similar platforms assume liability for an
inevitable compromise that results, in the extreme case, in
catastrophic damages?
Widely used internet platforms have largely shielded
themselves from liability through mass-market adhesion contracts,
at least as against their own users.8 In scenarios like the July 2020
Twitter hack, however, damages could extend beyond users that
have agreed to the terms of service and instead affect third-party
non-users. Historically, it has proven very difficult to hold
platform providers liable for the actions of individuals committing

6
The term “internet platform” is used loosely in this work to describe a
globally and publicly accessible, cloud-based communications tool. “Dangerous
internet platform” describes ones that should be subject to strict liability.
7
See Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has
the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 425 (2008) (“History, however,
suggests otherwise: the software market has failed to produce secure
software.”); Bruce Schneier, The Twitter Hacks Have to Stop, ATLANTIC (July
18, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/twitter-hackshave-stop/614359/ [https://perma.cc/E8XZ-32EY]. The absence of regulation
for social media platforms and most other targets for cyber criminals, is in sharp
contrast with the healthcare and financial sectors, which are subject to
heavyweight regulation. See, e.g., The Patchwork of Federal Data Protection
Laws, U.S. SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMM. (July 24, 2019),
https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/the-patchwork-of-federal-dataprotection-laws [https://perma.cc/HFH7-ZLDX].
8
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement
of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1553, 1562–63 (2005). For a typical
example, see Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php
[https://perma.cc/PC7W-492U] (last updated Oct. 01, 2020) (“We cannot predict
when issues might arise with our Products. Accordingly, our liability shall be
limited to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, and under no
circumstance will we be liable to you for any lost profits, revenues, information,
or data, or consequential, special, indirect, exemplary, punitive, or incidental
damages.”).
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torts using the providers’ platforms.9 While calls for modernizing
the regulatory framework bracketing modern software operations
become more frequent, the world is nevertheless stuck with the
threat that these platforms now pose.10
Therefore, given the magnitude and urgency of the threat,
certain particularly dangerous internet platforms, like Twitter,
should be exposed to strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities when the platform is compromised and results in
substantial damages. Much like those unwittingly living inside the
blast radius of commercial demolitions operations, Americans are
awash in the wake of global, ubiquitous communications tools.
When misused by malicious hands, these tools could potentially
unleash economic or even, in the most extreme cases, physical
damages due to preemptive military action.11 It is time for courts to
reign in risks of that magnitude.12
This Article proposes that dangerous internet platforms should
be held strictly liable for abnormally dangerous activities when a
compromise occurs that results in substantial pecuniary loss to
third-parties. Part II surveys current events which exemplify the
scope of the dangers that a compromised platform could cause.
Part III examines the potential avenues for liability in the event of
such a compromise and highlights that a finding for a plaintiff is
unlikely under any of the currently available strategies. Part IV
9

See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80
WASH. L. REV. 335, 339–40 (2005) (“[O]nline service providers enjoy total
immunity from liability as both distributors and as publishers.”).
10
See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad & Elif Kavusturan, A Commercial Law for
Software Contracting, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 775, 784–786 (2019).
11
Schneier, supra note 7; see also Corinne Purtill, Twitter Security Flaws
Pose a Unique Threat to Nuclear Diplomacy, Experts Say, ONEZERO (July 17,
2020), https://onezero.medium.com/twitter-security-flaws-pose-a-unique-threat-tonuclear-diplomacy-experts-say-b509e0eb2aad [https://perma.cc/3KUD-NF8Z] (“A
poorly worded tweet at the wrong time from a high-profile yet intemperate
user . . . could instigate nuclear conflict. A fraudulent tweet sent by a malevolent
actor determined to cause as much harm as possible could be even worse.”).
12
Schneier, supra note 7 (“Underspending on security, and letting society pay
the eventual price, is far more profitable. I don’t blame the tech companies.
Their corporate mandate is to make as much money as is legally possible. Fixing
this requires changes in the law, not changes in the hearts of the company’s
leaders.”).
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defines the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities and explores modern applications of the doctrine. Finally,
Part V and the Conclusion propose that courts go beyond the
proposals previously made in the literature and apply strict liability
for abnormally dangerous activities to economic damages resulting
from the malicious use of compromised internet platforms.
II. THE SCOPE OF DANGER FROM CYBERCRIME
The internet has become such a normalized part of American
life for most that raising the specter of catastrophic damages might
seem hyperbolic. Yet cyberattacks against states and state actors
are commonplace.13 Moreover, contrary to the impression that the
widespread use of the technology might suggest, these attacks are a
normal side effect of all networked software.14 The damages
resulting from such attacks lie on a spectrum, ranging from trivial
to seismic.15
A. The Unceasing Drumbeat of Consequential Cyberattacks
Cyberattacks against internet-connected services involving
states and state actors are routine.16 These attacks range from “data
13

See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2019 INTERNET CRIME REPORT,
https://pdf.ic3.gov/2019_IC3Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q78A-Q4QF] (last visited
Oct. 3, 2020) (citing nearly 14,000 instances of “government impersonation”
internet crimes in the United States in 2019, resulting in losses of more than 124
million dollars).
14
See Andrey Evdokimov, What It Takes to Be a CISO, KASPERSKY
DAILY (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/ciso-report/24288/
[https://perma.cc/QG6Z-Z87L] (surveying Chief Information Security Officers
and finding that the vast majority assume that breaches are inevitable).
15
See, e.g., Robert P. Hartwig, Cyberrisk: Threat and Opportunity, 1,
14-17 INS. INFO . I NST. (Oct. 2016), https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf
/cyber_risk_wp_102716-92.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3FE-NZ8S] (finding significant
variation in the per-record damages resulting from data breaches across
enterprises).
16
Significant Cyber Incidents, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUD.,
https://www.csis.org/programs/technology-policy-program/significant-cyberincidents [https://perma.cc/AH7Q-W6N7] (last visited Sept. 15, 2020).
COVID-19 has had an amplifying effect on incidents of cybercrime, causing a
“significant target shift from individuals and small businesses to major
corporations, governments and critical infrastructure.” INTERPOL Report
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theft and ransomware to the overtaking of systems with potentially
large-scale harmful consequences.”17 The fallout from these attacks
range widely, but substantial damages are not uncommon.18
Of the cyberattacks that are constantly in progress,19 some
small subset of them, when successful, result in substantial
economic or political consequences. In addition to the July 2020
Twitter hack, recent examples of various kinds of cyberattacks
with potentially nationwide ramifications include: (1) the recent
ransomware attack on the global GPS device and services
developer Garmin;20 (2) the 2017 Equifax compromise resulting in
a leak of nearly half of the American population’s private data;21
(3) the 2016 Mirai botnet attack, which made large portions of the
internet unavailable for nearly a day for American and European

Shows Alarming Rate of Cyberattacks During COVID-19, INTERPOL,
https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2020/INTERPOL-reportshows-alarming-rate-of-cyberattacks-during-COVID-19 [https://perma.cc/JPQ2QZ4H] (last visited Sept. 15, 2020).
17
Wild Wide Web, WORLD ECON. F., https://reports.weforum.org/global-risksreport-2020/wild-wide-web/ [https://perma.cc/HMY2-LAH5] (last visited Sept.
15, 2020).
18
See PUBLIC-PRIVATE ANALYTIC EXCH. PROGRAM, GEOPOLITICAL IMPACT
ON
CYBER THREATS FROM NATION-STATE ACTORS 1–2 (2019),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ia/ia_geopolitical-impactcyber-threats-nation-state-actors.pdf [https://perma.cc/SAX9-WTSL] (surveying
notorious incidents affecting multinational corporations, banks, power plants,
airports, and even Iran’s nuclear power weapons development program); see
also Madeline A. Labovitz, Your Natural Gas is Not Cyber-Secure, 21 N.C. J. L.
& TECH. 217, 231 (describing a foreign natural gas pipeline explosion
equivalent in magnitude to a nuclear weapon caused by malicious code); see
also infra Section II.C.
19
See Cyberthreat Real-time Map, KASPERSKY, https://cybermap.kaspersky.com/
[https://perma.cc/H6AC-Y67Y] (last visited Sept. 16, 2020).
20
Dan Goodin, Garmin’s Four-Day Service Meltdown Was Caused by
TECHNICA
(July
27,
2020,
4:03
PM),
Ransomware,
ARS
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/07/garmans-four-dayservice-meltdown-was-caused-by-ransomware/ [https://perma.cc/Y3WJ-RPYX].
21
Michael Riley et al., The Equifax Hack Has the Hallmarks of StateSponsored Pros, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 29, 2017, 1:33 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-09-29/the-equifax-hack-hasall-the-hallmarks-of-state-sponsored-pros [https://perma.cc/LGC5-CVP4].
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users;22 and (4) the notorious leaking of the Democratic National
Committee’s private emails.23
B. The Economic and Physical Damages Due to Cyberattacks
When a popular internet platform is compromised, rather than
steal data, the attackers can weaponize the platform itself given
untrammeled access to its facilities.24 After considering the
consequences of a diplomatic misunderstanding over Twitter, a
study from King’s College concluded that “social media [use by
international leaders] has the potential to be a disruptive
technology and exacerbate tensions during crises.”25 The authors of
the study conclude that due to the United States’ disproportionately
extensive use of Twitter relative to other countries, while “tweets
are unlikely to independently start a crisis . . . [t]here is a risk,
however, that tweets can enable or accelerate an ongoing crisis.”26
The King’s College study assumes that the users are all
legitimate government actors.27 Malicious users masquerading as
legitimate government actors could cause real-world damages,
since government actors and other actors whose accounts have
global reach are demonstrably vulnerable.28 In 2011, the NBC
22

Elie Bursztein, Inside the Infamous Mirai IoT Botnet: A Retrospective Analysis,
CLOUDFLARE BLOG (Dec. 14, 2017), https://blog.cloudflare.com/inside-mirai-theinfamous-iot-botnet-a-retrospective-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/23GA-MDU5].
23
See Jack Goldsmith, What is Old, and New, and Scary in Russia’s Probable
DNC Hack, LAWFARE (July 25, 2016, 10:39 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
what-old-and-new-and-scary-russias-probable-dnc-hack [https://perma.cc/42KURU6G] (“The Russian hack of the DNC was small beans compared to the
destruction of the integrity of a national election result.”).
24
The bulk of the scholarly legal commentary on so-called cybertorts refers
most often to data breaches. This work assumes that the potential damages when
a compromised platform is used to maliciously trade on the identities of
prominent users, institutions, or states easily transcend those stemming from
data breaches.
25
Williams & Drew, supra note 5, at 5.
26
Id. at 18.
27
Id. at 6.
28
Who’s Behind Wednesday’s Epic Twitter Hack?, HACKER NEWS,
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23864265 [https://perma.cc/8H5H-RTS2]
(last visited Sept. 17, 2020) (illustrating a wide range of discussion on this topic
from professionals in the software development industry); see also Justin (Gus)
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News Twitter account was compromised and broadcast two fake
tweets about a false attack on Ground Zero, the site of the 9/11
attacks in New York.29 In 2017, a disgruntled contractor working
for Twitter disabled U.S. President Donald Trump’s account.30
Twitter’s own CEO, Jack Dorsey, had his personal account
compromised in 2019.31 Most recently, in September of 2020, the
Prime Minister of India’s Twitter account was compromised in yet
another bitcoin scam.32
The possibility of substantial economic loss following a
compromise by a malicious user is very real.33 In 2013, the Twitter
account of the Associated Press was compromised by Syrian
hackers, resulting in a fake tweet about an explosion in the White
House.34 The result was a near-instantaneous 143-point plunge in
the Dow Jones Industrial average.35 While the market recovered
quickly, unrecoverable market losses are not infeasible.36
Hurwitz, Cyberensuring Security, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1495, 1509 (2017)
(discussing the range of motivations of attackers, including political or social
purposes, even including advancing a political agenda).
29
Elinor Mills, NBC News Twitter Account Hacked, CNET (Sept. 9, 2011,
3:33 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/nbc-news-twitter-account-hacked/
[https://perma.cc/Q8GQ-AZTD].
30
Mike Isaac & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Twitter’s Panic After Trump’s
Account is Deleted Caps a Rough Week, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/technology/trump-twitter-deleted.html
[https://perma.cc/TE4Q-SHXB].
31
Kate Conger, Twitter C.E.O. Jack Dorsey’s Account Hacked, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/30/technology/jack-dorseytwitter-account-hacked.html [https://perma.cc/9TAU-2YCS].
32
Indian Prime Minister Modi Twitter Account Hacked, BBC (Sept. 3, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-54007995 [https://perma.cc/UCT3-A6A6].
33
See Geoffrey Ingersoll, Inside the Clever Hack That Fooled the AP and
Caused The DOW to Drop 150 Points, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 22, 2013, 4:14 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/inside-the-ingenious-hack-that-fooled-the-apand-caused-the-dow-to-drop-150-points-2013-11 [https://perma.cc/4GES-NLYB].
34
Id.
35
Heidi Moore & Dan Roberts, AP Twitter Hack Causes Panic on Wall Street
and Sends Dow Plunging, GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2013, 3:41 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/apr/23/ap-tweet-hack-wall-streetfreefall [https://perma.cc/X62P-WV2L].
36
See Shawn Langlois, This Day in History: Hacked AP Tweet About White
House Explosions Triggers Panic, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 23, 2018, 2:08 PM),
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Because the possibility of physical damages due to a
preemptive military response is both outlandish and likely
transcends what is reachable through a suit in the common law of
torts, this analysis will focus on the more plausible scenario
involving sustained or permanent losses in the financial markets:
purely pecuniary losses.37 Although the actual damages resulting
from the July 2020 Twitter hack and the events discussed in this
section fall short of catastrophic, the potential damages do not.38
Bad actors are constantly looking for new ways to fraudulently
exploit the market’s response to disinformation.39
A plausible hypothetical: the Twitter and Facebook accounts of
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office are compromised and used
to fraudulently announce a change in the length of U.S. patent
terms from twenty years to seventeen years.40 U.S. markets would
likely immediately drop in response to such a predictable decline
in medium-term revenues. The fraud is detected and the market
recovers, but not before the attacker anonymously short-sells41
shares of IBM, Intel, and Apple, among the largest American

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-day-in-history-hacked-ap-tweet-about-whitehouse-explosions-triggers-panic-2018-04-23 [https://perma.cc/2USM-YNPH].
37
See Hartwig, supra note 15, at 14–17 (surveying the economic risk from the
standpoint of the insurer).
38
Alicia McElhaney, Fake News Creates Real Losses, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Nov.
18, 2019), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1j2ttw22xf7n6/Fake-NewsCreates-Real-Losses [https://perma.cc/6S6U-ZWZF] (giving an example of a 341
billion dollar near-instantaneous market plummet due to an erroneous news
report and estimating at least 39 billion dollars in annual market losses due to
“the deliberate creation and sharing of false or manipulated information to harm
others for personal, political, or financial gain” over the internet).
39
See Jennifer DeTrani, Short and Distort: How Companies are ‘Bearing’
Down on Market-Shifting Disinformation, ABOVE THE L. (Feb. 6, 2020, 12:47
PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2020/02/short-and-distort-how-companies-are-bearingdown-on-market-shifting-disinformation/ [https://perma.cc/4JAR-A5VR].
40
@USPTO, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/uspto [https://perma.cc/4KUU5LYB] (last visited Oct. 5, 2020); United States Patent and Trademark Office,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/uspto.gov/ [https://perma.cc/GQ46-CHU3]
(last visited Oct. 5, 2020).
41
James Chen, Short Selling, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated Feb. 4, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortselling.asp [https://perma.cc/Y3HQM7XV].
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assignees of thousands of patents.42 Unable to locate the
cybercriminal or recover from their losses, the affected financial
institutions may seek financial redress against Twitter and
Facebook.
C. The Inevitability of Compromise
The July 2020 Twitter hack described in the Introduction43 was
not the work of sophisticated criminal masterminds.44 It was
instead a fairly typical feat of social engineering, involving a
deliberate campaign to deceive employees into granting access to
internal administration systems.45 Social engineering attacks
exploit predictable tendencies of human beings that must
inescapably be involved with the maintenance and operation of
internet platforms.46
Beyond the vulnerability of human beings, perfectly secure
software is a fantasy.47 All software is susceptible to attack and, if
networked, potentially exploitable by any connected person in the
world.48 While platform providers might make every effort to build
and maintain secure systems, the most pragmatic among them
operate their platforms as if the worst-case compromise might
happen at any moment; indeed, effecting that worst case is likely
the precise, active goal of malicious actors operating without
42

2019 Top 50 US Patent Assignees, IFI CLAIMS PAT. SERVS. (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://www.ificlaims.com/rankings-top-50-2019.htm [https://perma.cc/2NLJ-63TT].
43
Supra Part I.
44
Robert McMillan, Twitter Links Hack to Phone-Based Phishing Attack,
WALL ST. J. (July 30, 2020, 11:37 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/twitter-linkshack-to-phone-based-phishing-attack-11596166657 [https://perma.cc/23KJ-RYWV].
45
Id.
46
What is Social Engineering?, KASPERSKY, https://usa.kaspersky.com/resourcecenter/definitions/what-is-social-engineering [https://perma.cc/U4KZ-HVU6] (last
visited Sept. 16, 2020).
47
Jane Chong, Why Is Our Cybersecurity So Insecure?, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 11,
2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/115145/us-cybersecurity-why-softwareso-insecure [https://perma.cc/BMS3-G8EB].
48
Bruce Schneier, Should U.S. Hackers Fix Cybersecurity Holes or Exploit
Them?, ATLANTIC (May 19, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/arc
hive/2014/05/should-hackers-fix-cybersecurity-holes-or-exploit-them/371197/
[https://perma.cc/N6NL-4ANE]; see also Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1501–07
(2017) (describing the challenges of building and operating secure software).
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pause.49 Among information security professionals, this type of
thinking is not alarmist—it is axiomatic.50 But despite the
inevitability of compromise and harm, the available tort theories
may not provide adequate—or any—relief.
III. EXISTING AVENUES FOR LIABILITY
A plaintiff damaged as the result of a malicious actor
compromising and abusing an internet platform with sufficient
reach to have substantial economic consequences might bring suit
under a number of different causes of action but will probably not
survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss.51 None of the
mainstream options available for a harmed plaintiff in an internet
platform case are likely to yield relief.
A. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The starting point for identifying criminal and civil liability for
the fallout of attacks on internet platforms is the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (“CFAA”).52 While civil liability for compensatory
damages, injunctive relief, or other equitable relief is available
against the attacker, the CFAA explicitly exempts internet platform
providers from civil liability under the provisions of the CFAA
“for the negligent design or manufacture of computer hardware,
computer software, or firmware,” which would seem to at best
49
Bruce Schneier, The Security Mindset, SCHNEIER ON SEC. (Mar. 25, 2008, 5:27
AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/03/the_security_mi_1.html
[https://perma.cc/YW49-N33H].
50
See Why Software Remains Insecure, DANIEL MIESSLER (June 6, 2019),
https://danielmiessler.com/blog/the-reason-software-remains-insecure/
[https://perma.cc/V5FU-VRA8] (“Basically, software remains vulnerable because
the benefits created by insecure products far outweigh the downsides. Once that
changes, software security will improve—but not a moment before.”); see also
Bruce Schneier, Why Computers Are Insecure, SCHNEIER ON SEC. (Nov. 1999),
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/1999/11/why_computers_are_in.html
[https://perma.cc/MS2J-FV6L] (“Security engineering involves programming
Satan’s computer. And Satan’s computer is hard to test.”).
51
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 9, at 362–83 (explaining that “most cybertorts
are stillborn”).
52
Russell Gribbell, Ransomware & the Tort of Negligent Cybersecurity, 45 N.
KY. L. REV. 23, 39 (2018).
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considerably narrow the window available for tort litigation under
this legislation.53
In one roughly analogous case, a federal court granted
injunctive relief under the civil liability provisions of the CFAA
against a defendant fraudulently impersonating Facebook accounts
to obtain credit to run hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of
unpaid advertisements.54 However, when a criminal hacker is
unavailable and liability is sought instead against the platform that
facilitated the compromise, federal courts continue to interpret the
civil liability provisions of the CFAA as not holding platforms
liable for negligent, insecure software design.55
B. Contract Liability
While the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”)
unambiguously identifies computer hardware as a good, the status
of software, in its various forms, has proved harder to classify.56 If
software is a good under the U.C.C., then Article 2 provisions
provide a substantial shield for internet platform providers in the
form of warranty disclaimers and limitations on liability and
remedies against users who have agreed to their terms of service.57
But the conception of software as a tangible good is out of sync
with the ways software is most commonly used as of 2020:
through “software licensing” or, most importantly to this analysis,
through “software-as-a-service” (“SaaS”), an abstraction roughly
synonymous with the popular term “cloud computing.”58 All of the
platforms vulnerable to the type of attacks discussed supra are
exclusively SaaS products, which is most closely analogized as a

53

18 U.S.C. § 1030; see also Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1508 (describing
how, as a practical matter, identifying or even successfully bringing suit against
the attackers is often impossible due to the “multiplicity of actors and difficulties
of designing secure systems”).
54
Facebook, Inc. v. Grunin, 77 F. Supp. 3d 965, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
55
See, e.g., DHI Grp., Inc. v. Kent, No. H-16-1670, 2017 WL 9939568, at *11
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2017).
56
See Rustad & Kavusturan, supra note 10, at 787–91.
57
See Scott, supra note 7, at 436–37.
58
See Rustad & Kavusturan, supra note 10, at 779–80.
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“service offered through access contracts.”59 If software is a
service, then it is governed by the common law of services and
Article 2 of the U.C.C. does not apply.60
Nevertheless, the U.C.C. has been the de facto source of law
for software contracts in the absence of a better alternative, with
incoherent legal rationales.61 Commentators are beginning to
suggest revisions to the U.C.C. to cover the realities of modern
cloud software, but until then, courts will operate without guidance
and badly outdated contract law will continue to dominate.62
However, a tort action might still be available to a non-user
who has not agreed to the adhesion contract presented by the
platform provider.63 In other words, even when it applies, the
antiquated contract law of U.C.C. Article 2 will only protect
platform providers from users who have voluntarily agreed to their
terms of service and license agreements.64 While many of the
platforms of concern here have billions of users, there are still
many billions who are not users, and thus many who have not
signed away their rights to bring suit against the providers.65
Despite having no contractual relationship to the platform

59

Id. at 780; see supra Section II.
Rustad & Kavusturan, supra note 10, at 872–73.
61
See id. at 824–25 (“[I]t is a legal fiction that software licensing and cloud
computing involve tangible goods.”).
62
See generally id. at 851–72 (proposing a new Article 2B to cover software
licensing and 2C to cover cloud computing); Holly K. Towle, Enough Already:
It Is Time to Acknowledge That UCC Article 2 Does Not Apply to Software and
Other Information, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 531, 536 (2011) (arguing that applying
Article 2 to software licensing will increasingly lead to wrong results).
63
See Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss
Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 553–56 (2009).
64
See, e.g., WECHAT - TERMS OF SERVICE, WECHAT, https://www.wechat
.com/en/service_terms.html [https://perma.cc/MD9J-FUQZ] (last updated Mar.
21, 2018) (“THESE TERMS GOVERN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
YOU AND US.”).
65
See Global Social Media Overview, DATAREPORTAL, https://datareportal.com
/social-media-users [https://perma.cc/FH48-PYYH] (last visited Oct. 4, 2020)
(estimating roughly half of the world’s population to be users of social media).
60
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providers, harmed non-users will nevertheless have standing to
bring suit under the usual constitutional test.66
C. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
Historically, internet platforms have been largely insulated
from liability stemming from content created by their own users
through Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.67 This
broadly interpreted provision has effectively immunized internet
platform providers from any liability resulting from torts
committed while using their platforms by allowing the providers to
self-identify as “publishers,” a result upheld many times over in
court.68
Thus, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act would
shield internet platform providers from liability under the theory
that the hackers who had gained access to the compromised
accounts were “information content providers” of the type
specified in Section 230(c)(1).69 While Section 230(e) explicitly
exempts federal criminal acts from immunity, the status of civil
actions against defendant platform providers due to the actions of
third-party criminals are less clear.70 There is substantial case law
holding that providers are shielded from liability when legitimate
users of services commit crimes using those services by, for

66

See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). Standing under state law
might vary somewhat from these standards.
67
47 U.S.C. § 230; see generally Benjamin Volpe, From Innovation to Abuse:
Does the Internet Still Need Section 230 Immunity?, 68 CATH. U. L. REV. 597,
601 (2019) (providing “legislative background along with an accounting of the
common law history of the CDA, specifically related to § 230 immunity of
internet service providers and online intermediaries”).
68
Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn’t Just Backpage:
Revising Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 453, 458–77 (2018).
69
See Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 [https://perma.cc/FEV2-QKL9] (last
visited Oct. 4, 2020).
70
See VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10306, LIABILITY FOR
CONTENT HOSTS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMMUNICATION DECENCY ACT’S SECTION
230 at 2 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10306.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WPAQVAG].
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example, distributing child pornography or selling drugs.71 How
courts will interpret Section 230 where the content’s author was a
third party controlling a compromised account to commit a
malicious act is unclear, but the history of its employment in
various courts suggests that it might immunize the providers even
in this context.72
D. Negligence
A finding of negligence will require a showing of duty, breach,
causation, and damages.73 Each of these elements present
challenges for a showing of provider negligence.74 To begin with,
to date, courts have not identified a duty of care for software
manufacturers to produce secure software.75 If a duty could be
identified, a test for breach would need to be embraced by courts
out of the many that have been proposed.76 Pecuniary damages
might be calculable, but would likely still be filtered from claims
by the economic loss rule discussed infra.77

71

See, e.g., Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 64–72 (2d Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, 140 S. Ct. 2761, (2020) (upholding Section 230 immunity for a social
media platform providing a forum to a known terrorist organization); see
generally Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not
Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401,
413–14 (2017) (cataloging criminal activities which have enjoyed Section 230
immunity).
72
See Citron & Wittes, supra note 71, at 413–14 (listing particularly
egregious examples of Section 230 applications); see also Jessica E. Easterly,
Terror in Tinseltown: Who Is Accountable When Hollywood Gets Hacked, 66
SYRACUSE L. REV. 331, 355–60 (2016) (considering whether Section 230
shields platforms when illicit private data is stolen from users by unauthorized,
malicious users). But see Mike Godwin, Clarence Thomas Is Begging Someone
to Sue Over Conservatives’ Most-Hated Internet Law, SLATE (Oct. 16, 2020),
https://slate.com/technology/2020/10/clarence-thomas-section-230-cda-contentmoderation.html [https://perma.cc/D7NU-S5DV].
73
65 C.J.S. Negligence § 19 (2020).
74
Scott, supra note 7, at 442.
75
See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 8, at 1567.
76
Scott, supra note 7, at 448.
77
See infra, Section V.C.3.
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The most difficult element of negligence to establish in the
context of an internet security breach is causation.78 Because
software is so complex, there might often be but-for causation in
the sense that a coding error led to an exploit.79 For the same
reason, however, causation might be found to be too remote for a
finding of proximate causation, especially if a standard of
foreseeability is used.80 Even if a security compromise is
inevitable, as a question of fact left to the jury, the level of
complexity in modern software systems provides ample fodder for
demonstrating that the connection between the defendant’s action
and the plaintiff’s injury is too “attenuated, remote, or freakish” to
prevail.81
Overall, the negligence approach, which evolved around
relatively simple physical events causing physical harm, is
incompatible with the complexity of internet-based torts. “[T]he
difficulty of imposing liability in negligence and contract models
[stemming from cybersecurity failures] has effectively created a
‘strict fault’ regime . . . which is governed by negligence and
contract law in name only [and in which] sophisticated parties
pervasively externalize risk upon unsophisticated parties.”82
The lens of negligence could also be focused on the decisions
of internet platforms prior to the creation of the software that
resulted in a compromise.83 If the risk cannot be eliminated even
after taking reasonable precautions—for example if a compromise
is inevitable—then negligence might lie where an argument can be
made that the platform providers never should have engaged in the
activity in the first place.84 However, even if it is arguably
unreasonable to provide a technology like Twitter to world leaders
78

See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 8, at 1602–03 (“Without a proximate
cause limitation, internet security breaches could create boundless liability.”).
79
See Scott, supra note 7, at 448.
80
See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 8, at 1601–02.
81
See JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS § 12.01, at 179 (6th
ed. 2018).
82
Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1528.
83
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 20 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010).
84
See id.
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and governments, the difficulty in adjudicating a claim of
institutional incompetence means that a finding of no duty is the
most likely outcome.85
E. Strict Product Liability
While the full force of strict product liability doctrine might be
brought to bear if software is viewed as a product like any other,86
courts have demonstrated an unwillingness to stretch the doctrine
to include software as a general rule.87 It is a fundamental theorem
of strict product liability that the manufacturer of a defective
product is best situated to bear the cost of personal injury or injury
to property.88 But courts have been mixed on the question of
whether software is a product or service,89 similar to the confusion
surrounding the application of the U.C.C., discussed supra.90
Product liability suits can find purchase under a theory of
garden-variety negligence when inadequate warnings or
instructions or defective designs are at issue.91 Alternatively, if the
products are adequately designed but not manufactured according
to specification, a finding of no-fault strict liability is possible.92
For damages due to a software security compromise, it must be
determined whether the compromise was the result of the design of

85

See id. at § 7, cmt. f (“For example, when a plaintiff claims that it is
negligent merely to engage in the activity of manufacturing a product, the
competing social concerns and affected groups would be appropriate
considerations for a court in deciding to adopt a no-duty rule.”).
86
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 19 reporter’s notes to cmt.
d (AM. L. INST. 1998).
87
Scott, supra note 7, at 469.
88
See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal.
1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
89
See Scott, supra note 7, at 466–67 (“While these factors may not argue in
favor of finding all software to be products, they strongly favor finding software
that is supposed to provide security for corporate and government computer
systems to be a product for product liability purposes.”); see also Bryan H. Choi,
Crashworthy Code, 94 WASH. L. REV. 39, n. 142 (2019) (listing “tantalizing
dicta” suggesting that software might be considered a product by courts).
90
See supra Section III.B.
91
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 19 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1998).
92
See id. § 2.
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the software or the implementation of that design in code.93
Distinguishing these two is likely to be highly fact-specific and
complex, and thus unlikely to yield relief.94 Having surveyed the
avenues for recompense available via various contemporary
theories of tort liability and finding them wanting, a novel
application of the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activities is considered next.
IV. STRICT LIABILITY FOR ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS
ACTIVITIES
The lack of a clear cause of action for harmed plaintiffs in the
event of catastrophic fallout from the inevitable compromise of an
internet platform is alarming. Because the body of law that has
grown alongside the internet has kept platform providers
well-shielded from liability, some commentators have suggested a
new route: the application of strict liability for these providers under
a theory of abnormally dangerous activities.95 This application,
however, will stretch the doctrine well past the envelope of the
contexts in which it has traditionally been applied.96
A. Abnormally Dangerous Activities Defined
The story of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
(“SLADA”)97 in its modern form usually begins with the
celebrated English case of Rylands v. Fletcher98 from the

93

See Scott, supra note 7, at 459.
See id. at 467–71; Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1523 (“Given the near
impossibility of designing defect-free software, many commentators believe that
it will be exceptionally difficult to successfully bring a products liability
claim.”).
95
Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and
Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 277–
96 (2007); Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1526.
96
Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1527–28.
97
The helpful acronym coined by Professor Boston is borrowed here. Gerald
W. Boston, Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activity: The Negligence
Barrier, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 597, 598 (1999).
98
Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
94

312

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 2

mid-nineteenth century.99 In Rylands, the wealthy defendant John
Rylands constructed a water reservoir over abandoned coal mine
shafts that connected with the active coal mine owned by Thomas
Fletcher on neighboring property.100 Probably due to an error on the
part of the builders, the partially-filled reservoir burst downwards,
resulting in cascading flooding of the shafts underneath into
Fletcher’s adjacent mine.101 Fletcher brought suit for negligence
and the English courts of appeals ultimately decided for Fletcher,
memorably articulating what would come to be known as strict
liability for abnormally dangerous activities.102 The decision from
the intermediate appellate court highlighted the elements of
outsized risk and foreseeability now found in the modern
formulation, and the holding of the highest court is associated with
the “common usage” portion of the doctrine.103 The Rylands
decisions are also notable in that they were an early example of
common-law courts departing from the rigid, procedure-dominated
writ system to a more flexible application of substantive law to a
novel situation,104 a suggestion which is again urged here.
The modern doctrine of SLADA provides an avenue for
no-fault findings of liability against tortfeasors under limited
circumstances.105 In contrast with negligence law, in which the
primary policy rationale is to encourage those with a legal duty to
exercise reasonable care, strict liability is appropriate when the risk
cannot easily be eliminated and a reduction of the risky activity is
preferable.106 The doctrine focuses on the inherent danger of certain
activities, not on the inherent danger of particular materials.107
99

See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Rylands v. Fletcher: Tort Law’s
Conscience, in TORT STORIES 207, 209–10 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 2003).
100
Id.
101
Id. at 210.
102
Rylands, L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 339–40.
103
See Abraham, supra note 99, at 213–14.
104
Id. at 214–215.
105
See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 385 (database updated October 2020).
106
See James T. Graves, Note, Minnesota’s PCI Law: A Small Step on the
Path to A Statutory Duty of Data Security Due Care, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1115, 1139–40 (2008).
107
DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 443 (2d ed. 2020).
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Importantly for software security, the doctrine assumes that “a
highly significant risk . . . remains . . . even when all actors
exercise reasonable care.”108 Distilled to its essence, SLADA is a
doctrine designed to “ensur[e] that liability for harms be assigned
to parties best able to bear it.”109
The Third Restatement offers two factors to consider when
determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous: “(1) the
activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical
harm even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors; and
(2) the activity is not one of common usage.”110 An activity is
abnormally dangerous if it satisfies both factors and need not
necessarily provide substantial value or utility.111
B. The Modern Scope of SLADA
The doctrine of SLADA evolved as the industrial revolution
blossomed in England and America, and the trend towards
requiring fault for a finding of liability was ascendant in courts.112
As the world became blanketed with modern technologies, the
potentially devastating effects of physical injury from probabilistic,
catastrophic mechanical failures gave rise to a growing
consciousness that a revised allocation of risk was needed, at least
in some cases.113
Despite the historical and precedential association of SLADA
with physical damages from large-scale disasters, courts have
108
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 20 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010).
109
Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1525.
110
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 20 (AM. L. INST. 2010). This update to the Restatement reduced the
SLADA factors in number from six to two but it is not unusual to see courts still
referring to the Second Restatement factors. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 520 (AM. L. INST. 1977). See, e.g., Navelski v. Int’l Paper Co., 771 F. App’x.
949, 952 (11th Cir. 2019).
111
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 20 cmt. k (AM. L. INST. 2010). The value to the community is subsumed
by the question of common usage in the revised Restatement.
112
See Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-Oriented Approach to Strict Tort Liability
for Abnormally Dangerous Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 341, 344–46 (1996).
113
See id.
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varied widely in their applications of the doctrine to the facts
presented by creative plaintiffs invoking it.114 The risks and
dangers under discussion here are novel, and the application of
SLADA to the new fact patterns of the twenty-first century is not
affirmatively foreclosed by statute or precedent, although there has
been no clear application of the doctrine beyond the canonical fact
patterns to date.115
For example, when a foreign bank brought suit against a
domestic bank in Dubai Islamic Bank v. Citibank,116 it requested
the court invoke SLADA against the defendant, alleging that the
defendant was “actively recruiting known financial terrorists . . .
each of whom is capable of destabilizing an entire country if not
an entire region, and providing them any service for which they
are willing to pay.”117 The court rejected the plaintiff’s proposal to
extend the doctrine beyond the physical realm, stating that the
court “does not feel it is appropriate to expand the scope of the
strict liability doctrine to embrace the banking and financial issues
presented here.”118
In rejecting another scenario with roughly analogous geometry,
courts have found that utilities operating physical plants as remote
sources of services to the public are not examples of abnormally
dangerous activities.119 In United States v. Southern California
114

See, e.g., King v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999)
(campfires); Thomalen v. Marriott Corp., 880 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mass. 1995) (fireeating); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mun. of Anchorage, 788 P.2d 726, 728
(Alaska 1990) (city water delivery systems); Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698
S.W.2d 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (radioactive emissions); King, Jr., supra note
112; see also id. at n.220 (highlighting various cases with plaintiffs that have
applied a SLADA theory of liability for purely economic damages with mixed
results).
115
Choi, supra note 89, at 51–52.
116
Dubai Islamic Bank v. Citibank, N.A., 126 F. Supp. 2d 659 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
117
Id. at 668 (emphasis added).
118
Id. at 669.
119
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 20 reporter’s notes to cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 2010). See, e.g., Bickett v.
Countrymark Energy Res., LLC, 250 F. Supp. 3d 309, 321–22 (W.D. Ky. 2017)
(citing Ky. Utils. Co. v. Auto Crane Co., 674 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Ky. App. 1983)).
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Edison Co.,120 a private hydroelectric utility plant was the
proximate cause of a major forest fire.121 The government argued
for strict liability, but the district court concluded that the “[claim
that the] hydroelectric utility plant is an ultrahazardous activity
conflicts with California law and is not supported by existing
federal statutory or decisional law.”122
Despite a disappointing lack of hints of modernization from
recent case law, the SLADA doctrine should nevertheless be
applied to abnormally dangerous activities conducted on internet
platforms, even where the harms are not physical.
V. STRICT LIABILITY FOR ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES
SHOULD APPLY TO DANGEROUS INTERNET PLATFORMS
SLADA should be applied to remedy economic damages
resulting from the compromise of dangerous internet platforms by
malicious actors. The highly significant risks of these platforms’
activities are manifestly foreseeable, are not preventable even with
reasonable care, and are not in common usage.123 This section
proposes a rule for the application of SLADA to this scenario and
grapples with the objections that flow naturally from the history
and precedent of the associated common law.
A. A Proposed SLADA Doctrine for Dangerous Internet Platforms
Professor Danielle Citron was among the first to propose the
application of SLADA to “bursting cyber-reservoirs of personal
data” in analogy to the infamous bursting water-reservoirs of
Rylands.124 But perhaps Citron did not take the metaphor far
enough, for modern citizens are also “adjacent” to internet
platforms with such latent power to do physical and economic
damage that the metaphor can be safely extended to include them
as well: “[a] third party’s criminal acts are the natural
120

United States v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 964 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
See id. at 969–70.
122
Id. at 991.
123
See Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1527 (“[T]he cybersecurity context arguably
presents a more ‘textbook case’ for the use of strict liability than seen in most
‘textbook cases.’”).
124
Citron, supra note 95, at 243–96.
121
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consequences of maintaining information reservoirs in much the
same way that flooding due to gravity or negligence naturally
accompanied water reservoirs.”125
The scenario exemplified by the July 2020 Twitter hack is
somewhat different in kind: although it is similar to the leakage of
confidential data in that it is due to the inevitable actions of
malicious actors, Citron’s “data breach” involves damages from
theft or misappropriation of data, not damages due to the platform
itself.126 The torts suggested by the July 2020 Twitter hack are
more akin to damages caused by a private nuisance, a cause of
action that shares common roots with SLADA.127
Strict liability for dangerous internet platforms has been
proposed by several commentators, but only in the context of data
breaches.128 But the scope and magnitude of the dangers that
internet platforms now expose the world to in the worst-case
scenario have quickly moved past those dangers associated with
now-routine data breaches.129
Therefore, courts should consider carefully the observation
made by Judge Posner:
By making the actor strictly liable—by denying him in other words an
excuse based on his inability to avoid accidents by being more
careful—we give him an incentive, missing in a negligence regime, to
experiment with methods of preventing accidents that involve not
greater exertions of care, assumed to be futile, but instead relocating,

125

Id. at 270–71. In 2020, we have arguably moved beyond “adjacent” in the
sense that the negative effects can be felt regardless of where we physically are,
or whether we in any sense opted-into the danger.
126
See id. at 255.
127
See Steven Kam, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi: Trespass to Chattels & A Doctrine
of Cyber-Nuisance, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 427, 440 n.79 (2004) (describing
the evolution of nuisance law from early strict liability doctrine).
128
See Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1498 n.1 (enumerating legal and industry
scholarship on the subject).
129
Williams & Drew, supra note 5, at 14; see also Danielle Jablanski, Herbert
S. Lin, & Harold A. Trinkunas, Retweets to Midnight, in THREE TWEETS TO
MIDNIGHT: EFFECTS OF THE GLOBAL INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM ON THE RISK OF
NUCLEAR CONFLICT (Harold A. Trinkunas, Herbert Lin, & Benjamin Loehrke
eds., 2020).
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changing, or reducing (perhaps to the vanishing point) the activity
giving rise to the accident.130

SLADA should be applied against dangerous internet platforms
when their activities have achieved such scale that an inevitable
compromise by a malicious actor has a reasonable chance of
resulting in substantial damages to third parties who are not users
of the platform. Furthermore, if invoked, courts should reject any
attempt to stretch the tortured interpretation of Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act even further to cover the
“publications” of non-user cybercriminals.131
Whether SLADA applies, and in particular whether the
activities of an internet platform should be considered abnormally
dangerous, should be a question of law evaluated according to
several factors:
(1) whether the platform has, as users, public figures or
organizations;
(2) whether those users have the potential to effect
significant damages by their words or acts;
(3) whether the words or acts of users of the platform are
visible to the public;
(4) whether the publicly visible words or acts of users of
the platform are construed to be directly attributable to
the users; and
(5) whether there exists a reasonable likelihood of
identifiable, substantial economic damages resulting
from a presumed compromise.132
This application of SLADA is an extreme remedy; courts
should justifiably be wary and apply it only when the risk is
maximal and the specific alleged damages are reasonably
130
Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th
Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
131
See, e.g., Citron & Wittes, supra note 71, at 415–18 (suggesting that courts
adopt a narrower reading of the statute and limit its application to actors
operating in good faith).
132
Platforms meeting criteria (1) through (4) are “dangerous internet
platforms.” Evaluation of (5) gives rise to the cause of action for particularly
situated plaintiffs.
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foreseeable.133 As it is a form of SLADA, no finding of fault or
defect is necessary for liability to take hold.
Once a platform has grown such that it becomes inherently
dangerous, it will need to “experiment with methods of preventing
accidents that involve . . . relocating, changing, or reducing
(perhaps to the vanishing point) the activity.”134 While eliminating
the activity altogether is not productive, for dangerous internet
platforms, this could mean a cap on the reach of accounts of some
public figures.135 Platforms could be forced to implement expensive
measures like human verification of posts or requiring even more
substantial security procedures on certain high-profile accounts.136
One commentator suggests that strict liability and “cyber
insurance” should be tightly coupled as a means to implement
strict liability for data breaches while simultaneously statutorily
limiting damages, ensuring the willingness of insurance companies
to underwrite policies.137 Such a scheme would also help to
mitigate a possible economic concern that could result from
implementation of SLADA across the industry, specifically, the
cascading, shifting of costs to consumers as a result of the specter
of no-fault findings of liability.138
Finally, the unmistakable social value that dangerous internet
platforms provide does not conflict with the application of
SLADA:
133

Baker v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 232 F. Supp. 3d 233,
248 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (“[A] private suit for damages [might lie] when an
individual or smaller group sustains a special loss that is different in kind from
the harm suffered by the rest of the community.”) (internal quotation omitted).
The challenging burden of identifying market segments particularly vulnerable
to compromise should fall to the platform providers.
134
Ind. Harbor Belt, 916 F.2d at 1177 (citation omitted).
135
See Joshua Boyd, The Most Followed Accounts on Twitter, BRANDWATCH
(Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.brandwatch.com/blog/most-twitter-followers/
[https://perma.cc/7LHW-T6CH] (cataloging Twitter accounts with tens or
hundreds of millions of followers).
136
See About Account Security, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/safetyand-security/account-security-tips [https://perma.cc/QKG7-RGXF] (last visited
Oct. 2, 2020). For example, two-factor authentication or updated client
recommendations could be mandated.
137
See Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1499–1500.
138
See id. at 1527–29.
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[SLADA] rests on the assumption that the activity’s advantages are
apparently substantial enough as to render reasonable the defendant’s
choice to engage in the activity . . . . [T]he point that the activity
provides substantial value or utility is of little direct relevance to the
question whether the activity should properly bear strict liability . . . .
[I]t is their commonness rather than their value that directly pertains to
the strict-liability issue.139

SLADA’s suggested application here is not meant to deter
platforms from existing or even prospering, but rather to exercise
extreme caution when its casual use by public figures ushers in
catastrophic risk.
B. Abnormally Dangerous Activities and the Goals of SLADA
The reorganized Restatement (Third) of Torts moved SLADA
into a volume subtitled “Physical & Emotional Harm,” calling into
question its applicability to purely economic loss.140 However, the
revised strict liability section is prefaced by stating that “strict
liability is one area of tort law in which a page of history can be at
least as relevant as a page of logic.”141 Therefore, this section
surveys the policy goals underlying the doctrine and adds to the
growing mass of commentary arguing that strict liability should be
considered by courts in the context of insecure software.142
One American Law Institute reporter distilled the revised Third
Restatement’s scattered rationales for SLADA into six elements
which will be briefly considered in turn against the proposed
application.143 First, the additional liability imposed by SLADA is
meant to encourage defendants engaging in dangerous activities to

139

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 20 cmt. k (AM. L. INST. 2010).
140
Id. at foreword.
141
Id. at ch. 4 scope note.
142
Scott, supra note 7, at 469 n.267; see also Citron, supra note 95, at 277–
96. But see Choi, supra note 89, at 51–52 (arguing that SLADA is an outdated
form of strict liability and that strict products liability or no-fault insurance are
better doctrinal fits).
143
See Kenneth W. Simons, The Restatement (Third) of Torts & Traditional
Strict Liability: Robust Rationales, Slender Doctrines, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1355, 1359 (2009).
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take even more care than they would under a negligence regime.144
This rationale is predicated on the theory that the marginal cost of
reducing risk beyond a negligence standard of care is small.145
Additionally, many abnormally dangerous activities are so
destructive that it is often impossible for plaintiffs to obtain the
evidence needed for a showing of breach.146 Strict liability
incentivizes defendants in those situations to take more enhanced
precautions than they would take in an ordinary negligence
regime.147
This rationale militates both for and against SLADA for
dangerous internet platforms. The costs of incremental
improvements to security for internet platform providers are
certainly not just marginal, and indeed may increase without
bound.148 The fact that substantially better security is not
necessarily achievable even with substantial additional investment
distinguishes this risk from the ones contemplated by the
Restatement. On the other hand, establishing evidence of causation
in a negligence suit might well be difficult or impossible.149
Second, SLADA is meant to apply a corrective to the
magnitude or frequency of dangerous activities.150 Limiting
“activity” is antithetical to the modus operandi of internet
platforms that depend on the network effect for increased

144
Id. at 1359 (citing the example of explosives destroying proof that would
be needed for a finding of negligence).
145
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 21 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“[Because] in most instances a
reasonable nonnegligent fence will succeed in restraining the defendant’s
livestock, the added burden that strict liability places on the livestock owner is
itself limited.”).
146
See Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 810 P.2d 917, 922 (Wash. 1991) (imposing
strict liability when a fireworks misfire destroyed all evidence of what caused
the misfire).
147
See Simons, supra note 143, at 1359.
148
See Rainer Böhme, Security Metrics and Security Investment Models, 5
INT’L WORKSHOP ON SEC. 10, 11 fig.1 (2010).
149
See Scott, supra note 7, at 448–49; supra Section III.D.
150
See Simons, supra note 143, at 1360.
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revenues.151 However, if the dangerous “activity” is instead defined
as that portion of the platforms’ operations involving exposure to
abnormal danger, as opposed to routine use, it can be reduced in
creative ways by internet platforms.152 If exposed to liability under
a SLADA theory, platforms might be forced to implement
expensive measures like human verification of publications or to
require even more substantial, onerous security procedures on
certain high-profile accounts, perhaps to the point of discouraging
use.153
Third, SLADA is justified when the defendant’s activity
imposes a risk on individual members of society that does not
reciprocally impose risk back on the defendant.154 Users of
dangerous internet platforms are exposed to a variety of risks, and
their perceptions of those risks to themselves and third parties vary
widely according to their level of sophistication.155 The platform
providers, on the other hand, are surely fully cognizant of the risks
of compromise, and are themselves potentially exposed to those
risks.
Along the same lines, the fourth rationale concerns
non-reciprocal benefit: whether the dangerous activity confers a
benefit on the defendant not shared by the members of the
community.156 A converse statement of the “common usage” prong
of the SLADA Restatement criteria, this rationale highlights that
“the appeal of strict liability for an activity is stronger when its
risks are imposed on third parties while its benefits are
concentrated among a few.”157 However, while the benefits of
151

See Feng Zhu & Marco Iansiti, Why Some Platforms Thrive and Others Don’t,
HARV. BUS. REV., https://hbr.org/2019/01/why-some-platforms-thrive-and-othersdon’t [https://perma.cc/35V8-D7LS] (last visited Oct. 2, 2020).
152
See infra Section V.A.
153
See Boyd, supra note 135 and accompanying text.
154
Simons, supra note 143, at 1361–62.
155
See, e.g., Paul van Schaik et. al, Security and Privacy in Online Social
Networking: Risk Perceptions and Precautionary Behaviour, 78 COMPUT. IN
HUM. BEHAV. 283, 292–93 (2018) (presenting an analysis of perceptions of risk
and precautionary behavior among Facebook users).
156
Simons, supra note 143, at 1363–66.
157
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 20 cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 2010).
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using an internet platform can fairly be described as diffuse, the
benefits received by high-profile actors, like heads of state, are of a
different kind entirely from those obtained by, say, teenagers. For
example, the ability to globally announce a major policy change is
not, in practice, shared by most users, who are enjoying the
platforms for social reasons.158 The benefits to the platform
providers, on the other hand, scale roughly with numbers of users,
whatever benefit those users may derive from it, and affected third
parties might receive no benefit at all. In other words, the bulk of
the benefits are retained by the platform providers and a small
number of elite users.
Fifth, application of SLADA is associated with near-exclusive
causation, a characterization fraught with philosophical
hangnails.159 Regardless of the difficulties of pinning down the
definition of causation in the context of dangerous internet
platforms, if the scope of liability is limited to non-users, the case
for exclusive causation is even stronger than the canonical example
of blasting, wherein the injured resident could (theoretically)
simply move.160 SLADA is “designed largely to protect innocent
third parties or innocent bystanders.”161 The potential pecuniary
harm caused by dangerous internet platforms will exist as long as
large numbers of individuals rely on it, which is something an
individual plaintiff cannot control.
Sixth, the Restatement affords weight to the community’s
sense of fairness: “Basic public attitudes tend to be accepting of
familiar and traditional risks, even while apprehensive of risks that
are uncommon and novel. The law should be respectful of public
158

See Aaron Smith, Why Americans Use Social Media, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 15,
2011), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2011/11/15/why-americans-use-socialmedia/ [https://perma.cc/APS3-LQT3] (“Roughly two thirds of social media
users say that staying in touch with current friends and family members is a
major reason they use these sites.”).
159
See Simons, supra note 143, at 1368–72 (“[I]t is either incoherent or false
to claim that the person who engages in blasting is the only or principal cause of
the victim’s harm.”).
160
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 20 cmt. k (AM. L. INST. 2010).
161
Id. § 24.
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attitudes of this sort.”162 It is hard to say how the public at large
would perceive the fairness of strict liability for dangerous internet
platforms under these circumstances; the phenomenon of damages
at this scale is too new to predict. But it might be equally said that
the public does not appreciate the danger posed by these apparently
innocuous tools. It might also be labeled unfair that an accident
due to the lax security practices of a moderately-sized private
company in California can have instantaneous, severe, or
nationwide repercussions at all.
The goals of SLADA as delineated by the Third Restatement
are consonant with the risks dangerous internet platforms force on
society. But application of the doctrine will nevertheless face
substantial obstacles erected by common law precedent.
C. Obstacles in Applying SLADA to Dangerous Internet Platforms
An application of SLADA to non-physical, purely economic
damages to third parties due to the malicious actions of
cybercriminals encounters substantial precedential hurdles. Here,
the first subsection circumvents the traditional application of
SLADA only to physical harms with recourse to underlying policy
goals. The next subsection recasts the ordinary common usage
objection in light of the way modern technology is actually used.
Then, a route around the bar against damages for purely economic
harms is identified. Finally, the last subsection argues that that
route should be exploited to avail plaintiffs of tort liability to
redress damages caused by the actions of third-party criminals
where a special relationship due to foreseeability exists.
1.

Physical Damages
At early common law, injuries in tort were generally associated
with direct contact, and fault was seen as related to the physical
actions of the defendant.163 SLADA evolved during the industrial
revolution as a parallel path to liability alongside negligence,
usually portrayed as growing out of the decision in Rylands.
162

Simons, supra note 143, at 1372–73 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 cmt. j (AM. L. INST.
2010)).
163
See King, Jr., supra note 112, at 343–44.
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“Rylands is the first and foremost exemplar of the strict liability
alternative to negligence liability for accidental personal injury and
property damage.”164 As the doctrine homogenized across the
country, neither the First nor the Second Restatements specified
“physical” harm in their respective SLADA sections, specifying
only serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others.165 The
Third Restatement explicitly added “physical harm,” but the
comments and reporters’ notes do not explicitly rule out
non-physical damages.166
Despite these recent updates, some courts still relying on the
Second Restatement have shown flexibility regarding non-physical
damages.167 For example, in Peters v. Amoco Oil Co.,168 when
underground leaking storage tanks belonging to an oil company
bled into neighboring properties, but had not yet caused any
physical damage, a district court in Alabama rejected the
defendant’s motion to dismiss the SLADA claim, interpreting the
Restatement to “not require physical contact or damage, and
[finding that the] Defendants [failed] to provide any authority
containing such requirement.”169
In another groundwater contamination suit against oil
companies, Harthman v. Texaco, Inc.,170 a district court rejected the
defendant’s summary judgment motion, interpreting the
Restatement’s requirement for “harm” in SLADA cases broadly as
“[including] the impairment of pecuniary advantage, intangible
rights and other legally recognized interests” and holding that the

164

Abraham, supra note 99, at 226.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 519–20 (AM. L. INST. 1938);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (AM. L. INST. 1977).
166
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 20 (AM. L. INST. 2020). However, the definition of “physical harm”
provided does militate strongly against this interpretation. See id. at § 4.
167
See, e.g., Brantley v. Int’l Paper Co., No. CV 2:09-230-DCR, 2017 WL
2292767, at *5 (M.D. Ala. May 24, 2017) (“[E]xpansion of the doctrine to other
activities has not been foreclosed.”).
168
Peters v. Amoco Oil Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
169
Id. at 1286.
170
Harthman v. Texaco, Inc. (In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig.), 909 F.
Supp. 991 (D.V.I. 1995).
165
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plaintiff “may recover for negligence or strict liability without
showing that they have suffered physical harm.”171
Beyond interpretations of what the reporters of the Restatement
intended, convincing a court to apply SLADA to non-physical
damages requires recourse to the policy justifications of SLADA,
which are not themselves necessarily linked to physical harms.172
Advocates should focus on the novel nature and foreseeability of
abnormal danger in lieu of the black-letter Restatement text.
2.

Common Usage
The “common usage” prong of the Restatement’s SLADA test
ensures that the doctrine is only enforced against “abnormal”
activities.173 An activity is one of common usage if “it is carried on
by a large fraction of the people in the community.”174 This is so
even if the activity is engaged in by only a single party, even if
substantial numbers of people are somehow “connected to the
activity.”175 When considering SLADA for new technologies like
“cyber-physical” systems, one scholar warns that “technological
novelty should not be conflated with abnormality.”176
Still, while it is undeniable that dangerous internet platforms
are in extremely common usage, the metaphors used to exemplify
common usage do not graft well onto this case. At first glance,

171

Id. at 999 (invoking the Restatement (Second) of Torts general definition
of “harm” in section 7, cmt. b and broadly interpreting the wording of section
519, “harm to the person, land or chattels”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 7 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(1)
(AM. L. INST. 1977); see also Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 1006 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (“Case law in other jurisdictions also supports the
proposition that plaintiffs may recover for economic injuries that defendant’s
pollution caused, even though there was no physical damage to plaintiffs’
property.”).
172
See supra Section V.B.
173
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 20 cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 2020).
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Choi, supra note 89, at 51 (considering looming examples such as
autonomous vehicles deployed in dense residential areas as unlikely to be found
to be abnormally dangerous).
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dangerous internet platforms could be analogized to power lines.177
Like power lines, access to the platforms is distributed to the
community via the internet, itself physically a network of wires.178
The power company is said to be “engaging in the [abnormally
dangerous] activity,” but since the distribution network—the
wires—are ubiquitous, people are “connected to the activity” and
power lines are therefore in common usage.179
However, this analogy oversimplifies the presence of power
lines in society. Residences receive standard residential power
connections, with well-understood safety considerations. On the
other hand, industrial installations have extremely high-power
demands, involving more significant safety procedures,
unattainable by normal power consumers.180 Dangerous internet
platforms place the industrial connection in the palms of prominent
public figures who similarly lack the ability to implement
improved security. Additionally, unlike power lines, which are a
physical embodiment of a danger in common usage, there is no
physical reminder, or indeed any reminder at all during routine use,
that internet platforms could pose any sort of catastrophic
danger.181 Finally, while social media posts taken as a whole are
nothing short of torrential, the discrete uses of dangerous internet
platforms by actors capable of effecting severe consequences on
markets constitute only a minute fraction of total uses.182
177

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 20 cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 2010).
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
See, e.g., Dennis K. Neitzel, Electrical Safety for Industrial and
Commercial Power Systems, 2016 IEEE IAS ELEC. SAFETY WORKSHOP, 114,
115–20 (summarizing safety procedures for industrial and commercial power
systems).
181
Twitter Terms of Service, T WITTER, https://twitter.com/en/tos
[https://perma.cc/6K9M-MC98] (last updated June 18, 2020) (waiving liability for
“ANY CONDUCT OR CONTENT OF ANY THIRD PARTY ON THE SERVICES,
INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY DEFAMATORY, OFFENSIVE OR
ILLEGAL CONDUCT OF OTHER USERS OR THIRD PARTIES”).
182
Compare Twitter Usage Statistics, INTERNET LIVE STATS,
https://www.internetlivestats.com/twitter-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/KZ5W-FWTE]
(last visited Oct. 18, 2020) (counting hundreds of millions of Tweets sent
globally each day), with National Politics on Twitter: Small Share of U.S. Adults
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Another example of a commonly used and omnipresent utility
with underappreciated inherent destructive power involves the
underground gasoline storage tanks underlying typical gas
stations.183 Although the activities of a gas station in providing gas,
and the reciprocal activities of a patron in purchasing and pumping
gas are obviously quite familiar, the threat posed by a catastrophic
failure of these tanks while standing atop them is potentially
uncommon, although courts are split on this question.184 No
bright-line rule has been identified. For example, in Peters, a
federal court found the question of whether the storage of gasoline
would constitute an “unusual and extraordinary” use of property to
be a fact-bound question for the jury.185
Still, American courts have shown an overall reluctance to
push the boundaries of common usage since the emergence of
another potentially spectacularly powerful source of risk in the
middle of the twentieth century: nuclear energy.186 Moreover, what
is considered common usage varies widely between jurisdictions,
implying a reluctance by courts to make bright-line rules about
strict liability and reinforcing the context-dependent nature of the
common usage determination.187 Also, humanity’s relationship to
risk has become more comfortable as people have become
surrounded by technology, and life, at least relative to technology,
has in fact become safer.188 Nevertheless, these observations about
context and technology in the history of the common law mean
only that where the doctrine has once moved in one direction, it
can move again where technology has changed in ways never
anticipated.189
Produce Majority of Tweets, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/10/23/national-politics-on-twitter-smallshare-of-u-s-adults-produce-majority-of-tweets/ [https://perma.cc/TA7B-H5W6].
183
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 20 reporter’s notes to cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 2010).
184
Id.
185
Peters v. Amoco Oil Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1286 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
186
Abraham, supra note 99, at 224.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 227 (“We study Rylands not only because of what it was and is, but
also because of what it might have been and might still become.”).
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3.

Purely Economic Loss
Another formidable obstacle faced by a plaintiff affected by a
compromise of an internet platform causing significant, lasting
pecuniary fallout is the economic loss rule.190 Commonly stated as
there can never be recovery for purely economic loss in a tort
action,191 the Third Restatement more fully states that “there is no
liability in tort for economic loss caused by negligence in the
performance or negotiation of a contract between the parties.”192
The economic loss doctrine is largely predicated on the notion
that the risk of purely economic loss should be allocated exclusively
according to contract law.193 The doctrine assumes that the
consequential damages flowing from the accident are the result of the
plaintiff’s disappointed expectations.194 In other words, the economic
loss doctrine assumes the existence of a contract in the first place.195
As between strangers with no contractual relationship, the
majority of jurisdictions follow the 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet
Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc.196 decision.197 In 532 Madison
Ave. Gourmet, the New York Court of Appeals held that monetary
damages to neighboring businesses stemming from the economic
fallout due to a collapsed, negligently constructed building were
foreclosed, absent some special relationship between the parties.198
The court focused on the unlimited spectrum of liability that
defendants might be exposed to under these circumstances, stating:
“however careless the conduct or foreseeable the harm . . . [t]his
190

Scott, supra note 7, at 470–71.
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 8, at 1580.
192
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 3 (AM. L.
INST. 2020).
193
Jeffrey L. Goodman, Daniel R. Peacock & Kevin J. Rutan, A Guide to
Understanding the Economic Loss Doctrine, 67 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 17–26 (2019)
(describing the majority rule: “if the plaintiff suffers purely economic damages,
the plaintiff’s only avenue of recovery is through contract”).
194
Id.
195
Johnson, supra note 63, at 547–48.
196
532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d
1097 (N.Y. 2001).
197
Catherine M. Sharkey, Can Data Breach Claims Survive the Econ. Loss
Rule?, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 339, 348–49 (2017).
198
532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc., 750 N.E.2d at 1101–03.
191
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restriction is necessary to avoid exposing defendants to unlimited
liability to an indeterminate class of persons conceivably injured
by any negligence in a defendant’s act.”199 But in no-contract
scenarios, the rationale for the economic loss rule that emphasizes
the primacy of the separate domains of contract and tort law is not
applicable.200 Moreover, a minority of jurisdictions have shown a
willingness to depart from the orthodoxy of the economic loss rule,
particularly when a foreseeable, identifiable class of plaintiffs is
available in lieu of unlimited liability.201
Some courts have considered and rejected the invocation of
SLADA for purely economic loss.202 For example, in Rosenblatt v.
Exxon Co.,203 a tenant tried to sue the former owner of a tract of
land whose actions resulted in toxic contamination of the land by
gasoline for the economic losses resulting from failed business
opportunities. The court found the relationship between the tenant
and former landowner to be too attenuated.204
Thus, these holdings and the requirement for a bounded set of
plaintiffs suggest that a more substantial relationship between
prospective plaintiffs and the platform provider defendant must be
identified to recover economic losses, which courts have found
through foreseeability.205 High-profile users of dangerous internet
platforms will each map to different foreseeable sets of plaintiffs;
anticipating the scope of a potential compromise might be a
daunting task for platform providers, but seems a reasonable

199

Id. at 1101.
532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 271 A.D.2d
49, 52 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (citing Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,
275 U.S. 303 (1927)) (“[A] claimant suffering purely financial losses is
restricted to an action in contract for the benefit of its bargain.”).
201
Sharkey, supra note 197, at 358–60.
202
See e.g., In re One Meridian Plaza Fire Litig., 820 F. Supp. 1460, 1476–
1477 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (“[P]laintiffs cannot circumvent the economic loss
doctrine by its allegations of strict liability based on an abnormally dangerous
activity.”).
203
Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 642 A.2d 180 (Md. 1994).
204
Id. at 188.
205
See infra Section V.C.4.
200
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burden to fall on the shoulders of the enterprise that stands to
benefit most from the celebrity voice of its users.206
Another route around the precedential wall erected by the
economic loss doctrine, as suggested by Professor Citron in 2007,
imagines reconceptualizing the nature of torts for the Information
Age.207 In contrast to a self-worth defined by the ability to perform
physical work with their bodies and property, Citron posits that
“individuals [now] define themselves by their interactions and
integrity in the marketplace” and that therefore “the law should
adapt to account for injuries to our changed conception of
personhood in the twenty-first century.”208 Such a
reconceptualization would include economic damages related to,
for example, the fallout from a data breach.209
Since 2007, however, dangers posed by the internet have
grown enough that a reconceptualization of the nature of potential
tort damages is no longer necessary. Citron compares the metaphor
relating reservoirs of data to Rylands’ reservoirs of water, but the
metaphorical parallels between the two types of “reservoirs” are
less important than the actual fact of extreme danger.210 The
common law should include these extreme dangers among those
considered abnormally dangerous.
4.

Tort Liability for Third-Party Criminals
Without a statutory basis for liability, the starting point for
building a case for any sort of common law liability consists in
showing that the internet platform providers can be held liable for
the actions of third-party criminals. The canonical case on-point is
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp.,211 where a duty
to protect as between landlords and tenants was identified when the
landlord had actual or constructive notice of a threat to the
206

See, e.g., Meiring de Villiers, Reasonable Foreseeability in Info. Sec. Law:
A Forensic Analysis, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 419, 471–75 (2008)
(developing a metric for estimating the foreseeability of compromise in
cybersecurity contexts).
207
Citron, supra note 95, at 295–96.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 296.
210
Id. at 279.
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Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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tenants.212 Scholars have argued that this holding should be applied
to the relationship between computer database operators and
subjects of data breaches, whose identities could be compromised
in the event of a breach.213
Thus, a finding of liability against a compromised dangerous
internet platform depends on the identification of a duty between
the parties, a legal theory that exists only in nascent form in the
realm of software security.214 However, since Kline, the DC Circuit
has further refined the relationship required between parties and
indicated that a legal duty might not always be required: “If the
relationship . . . strongly suggests a duty of protection, then
specific evidence of foreseeability is less important, whereas if the
relationship is not of a type that entails a duty of protection, then
the evidentiary hurdle is higher.”215 In other words, even without a
legal duty, if the damage was highly foreseeable, a defendant can
still be found liable for the actions of third parties.216
Outside of the DC Circuit, some courts have eliminated the
duty requirement in light of substantial foreseeability in the context
of data security. In In re Arby’s Restaurant Group Inc.
Litigation,217 a federal court applied Georgia law and found a
common law duty where hackers stole the credit card data of
212

See generally id. at 481 (“The rationale of the general rule exonerating a
third party from any duty to protect another from a criminal attack has no
applicability to the landlord-tenant relationship . . . [The landlord] certainly is no
bystander. [Where he] has notice . . . and has the exclusive power to take
preventive action, it does not seem unfair to place upon the landlord a duty to
take those steps which are within his power to minimize the predictable risk to
his tenants.”).
213
Johnson, supra note 63, at 572–76; Citron, supra note 95, at 261–63 n.
116; Rebecca Crootof, The Internet of Torts: Expanding Civil Liability
Standards to Address Corporate Remote Interference, 69 DUKE L.J. 583, 630–
33 (2019) (considering the identification of a duty between “Internet of Things”
companies and their users).
214
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 8, at 1586–76; Johnson, supra note 63, at
575–76; see supra Section III.D.
215
Workman v. United Methodist Comm., 320 F.3d 259, 264 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
216
Ridgell v. HP Enter. Servs., LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1, 21 (D.C. 2016)
(quoting Potts v. D.C., 697 A.2d 1249, 1252 (D.C. 1997)).
217
In re Arby’s Rest. Grp. Inc. Litig., No. 1:17-CV-0514-AT, 2018 WL
2128441 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 5, 2018).
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hundreds of thousands of consumers, holding that “allegations that
a company knew of a foreseeable risk to its data security systems
are sufficient to establish the existence of a plausible legal duty.”218
As argued supra, compromises of dangerous internet platforms are
not only foreseeable, they are inevitable.219
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a large chasm to cross before a court will agree to
apply the doctrine of SLADA to dangerous internet platforms.
Common law precedent holding the rule to apply only in the
context of a narrowly defined subset of property damages, along
with the longstanding economic loss rule, will require a court to
make a bold step away from longstanding legal doctrines. But
SLADA “is tort law’s conscience, an always-available alternative to
the negligence system that persistently causes us to examine the
justifications for the limitations on liability that are inherent in
[existing tort law].”220
The threat posed by certain internet platforms with global
reach, used daily by governments and world leaders, was
obviously not anticipated by the aggregated authors of those
precedents. It is becoming progressively less controversial to argue
that these internet platform providers should be exposed to liability
in some form for consequences stemming from preventable
compromises of their software security, especially given the
218
Id. at *5; see also In re: The Home Depot, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach
Litig., No. 1:14-MD-2583-TWT, 2016 WL 2897520, at *4 (N.D. Ga. May 18,
2016) (“A retailer’s actions and inactions, such as disabling security features and
ignoring warning signs of a data breach, are sufficient to show that the retailer
caused foreseeable harm to a plaintiff and therefore owed a duty in tort.”); In re
Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 362 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1320
(N.D. Ga. 2019) (comparing “criminal data breaches to the peculiarly similar
context of premises liability where [at least one court] has held that if a
proprietor has reason to anticipate a criminal act, then he or she has a duty to
exercise ordinary care to guard against injury from dangerous characters.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
219
See supra Section II.C.
220
Abraham, supra note 99, at 207. Abraham believes that the impact of
Rylands and SLADA theory generally is minimal and out of proportion with its
actual adoption in US jurisdictions since the mid-twentieth century.
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unjustifiable immunity usually found to exist under Section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act.221 It is for jurists to decide what
form that will take, unless and until Congress takes action. In the
case of the most extreme dangers posed by these platforms, the
analog to the dangers originally observed by the Rylands court are
clear: such platforms must either assume liability for the
consequences of compromises that are certain to occur, or else they
must cease to exist in their current abnormally dangerous form.
It took some twenty years after Rylands was decided in
England before American courts adopted the doctrine.222 Even
greater than the gradual forces of change associated with
industrialization and economic growth, some commentators draw a
direct line between particular massive disasters and the adoption of
SLADA in the United States, notably the Johnstown Flood of 1889
in Pennsylvania, in which the South Fork Dam in the outskirts of
Pittsburgh burst and killed over 2,000 due to the negligence of
wealthy country club owners.223 Perhaps we must wait until a
cyber-Johnstown occurs; or perhaps it has already happened.

221
See generally Citron & Wittes, supra note 68 (proposing a judicial
overhaul of Section 230 jurisprudence based on reasonable precautions).
222
Citron, supra note 95, at 275; see also Jed H. Shugerman, The Floodgates
of Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of Fletcher v. Rylands
in the Gilded Age, 110 YALE L.J. 333, 334–35 (2000).
223
Citron, supra note 95, at 275; Peter Smith, Johnstown Flood of 1889: Greatest
Disaster in the State Continues to Resonate, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (May 24,
2014, 11:57 PM), https://www.post-gazette.com/news/state/2014/05/25/JohnstownFlood-of-1889-continues-to-resonate/stories/201405250142 [https://perma.cc/3F59YZRN] (“A jury of Pennsylvania Lutherans, Reformed Dutch, Presbyterians,
Methodists, Baptists or Catholics will not take readily to the attempt to cast the
responsibility of such a catastrophe from the shoulders of the fine rich
gentlemen who owned the fish pond and the rotten dam to the shoulders of
God.”) (quoting The Law of Bursting Reservoirs, 23 AM. L. REV. 643, 647
(1889)).
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